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The Regularity of Business Cycles
ABSTRACT
Do business cycles have predictable periodicities orare they random
walks without past regularities or predictive value? Arguments insupport of
either position are found in the literature, with noapparent convergence to
an agreement. This paper first examines the implications of the NBER
chronologies and other findings for the question of the regularity of business
cycles. It discusses hypotheses and presents evidence concerning the
incidence and coexistence of cycles with different periods. An extensionof
the analysis covers growth cycles in the United States and othermajor
countries.
The paper then considers different models --linear,nonlinear,
endogenous, and exogenous --forwhat they have to say about the problem. The
regularity of investment cycles and the possible asymmetries in cyclical
behavior receive particular attention, and some related data and testsare
provided.
Our results suggest that business cycles defy simple characterizations:
they show a strong tendency to recur and at times even near periodicity,along
with great diversity and evolution of phase durations. Theage of a phase is
not of much help in predicting the date of its end; theregularities are
mainly in the dynamics of the developing business conditions.
Victor Zarnowitz




Do business cycles have predictable periodicities? Do theirphases die
of old age? Or are the observed fluctuations merely random walkswithout past
regularities of predictive value? These questions are central to modern
macroeconomic dynamics and they have prompted a considerable amount of
theoretical and empirical analysis. Yet the answers differ, withno apparent
convergence to an agreement. There is much support for the notion that
business fluctuations are just random deviations fromgrowth trends, but also
for theories that stress the essentialregularity of features and even the
uniformity of causes of expansions and contractions in macroeconomicactivity.
This analytical situation is clearly both unsatisfactory and not
uncommon. It could be due to any or all of the following: the controversial
nature of the underlying issues and strong prior beliefs of theinquirers;
neglect or selective use of the evidence; loose concepts anddiversity of the
busines cycles of experience.
In this paper, an attempt is made to comprehend theproblems behind this
apparent impasse by reviewing the literature and historical evidence. This
approach lacks the terse elegance, but also the frequently spuriousprecision,
of a single quantitative model or formula: the informedjudgment it yields
may well be more dependable.
Past studies, at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and
elsewhere, have shown a persistence of sequential relationships and
interactions among time series representing a widerange of economic,
financial, and other variables. The common features of business cycles
observed in the principal market-oriented economies consistmainly of the
structure of lags and correlations connecting these "cyclical indicator"
series. On the whole, this line of'worksuggests the existence of a recursive2
system that plays a central role in the generationand propagation of business
cycles. It stresses the endogenous and deterministicrather than the
exogenous and random elements of the process,but stops short of expecting the
longer-than-seasonal business fluctuations to have similardurations and
amplitudes over time. This report is concerned only with theoverall
dimensions of business cycles, not with the characteristic interplay of the
indicators, but the measures it presents are generally consistent withthe
view of the cycle just outlined.
Part II of the paper examines the implications of the NBER chronologies
and other findings for the question, How regular in duration have business
cycles been? There are brief discussions of the hypotheses and evidence
concerning the incidence and coexistence of cycles with different periods,
short, intermediate, and long. Some new pieces of evidence are introducedand
assessments made. The analysis is extended to fluctuations in detrended
series ("growth cycles") for the United States and other major countries since
I 98.
Part III considers different theories for what they imply about the
regularity of business cycles. The relevant concepts vary over a wide
range: linear models with damping and white-noise shocks, modelsof the
"political business cycle," nonlinear models with limit cycles or irregularly
oscillating growth. The problem of asymmetry in cyclical behavior deserves
and receives particular attention, and some data and tests bearing on it are
provided. The final sections look at the questions raised in the opening
paragraph above in a still different way, by considering the role of calendar
vs. historical time, and the predictability and costs of business cycles.
Part IV sumsupthe results.3
11. Durations and Periodjcjties
1. Business Cycle Chronologies
The earliest dates of business cycle peaks (P) andtroughs CT), compiled
in annualtermsfromlimited but well explored information,suggest that
between 1790 and 1860 both Great Britain and the United Statesexperienced
business cycles of the same overall frequency (11) andaverage duration (about
1 years). Table 1, however, also indicates that theindividual phases and
cycles varied much in length for both countries butparticularly the U.S.
Relative to the corresponding mean durations, thestandard deviations
tabulated for Britain have a range of 30-63% andaverage L2%; for the U.S. the
range is 33—79%, the average 511%.In Britain all but two of the expansions
lasted 2-5 years and all but two of the contractionslasted one or two
years. In the United States four expansions were shorter than twoyears and
one was longer than five years; four contractions exceededtwo years.
For periods between 18511 and 1938monthly and quarterly as well as annual
lists of reference dates are available for the twocountries from the NBER
study by Burns and Mitchell, while the chronologies for Franceand Germany are
somewhat shorter. The summary measures in Table 2indicate a substantial
dispersion of the durations of business cycles and theirphases as dated by
the National Bureau. The S.D./mean ratios (coefficientsof variation) average
110—60% for expansions, close to 70% forcontractions, and over 110% for full
cycles, based on the longest periods listed (lines 11,11, 111, and 17). The
ranges of duration in months for the cycles before 1939 areas follows:4
Table 1






7 2.8 1.6 2.141.9 5.1
7 2.14 1.5 1.7 1.1 14.1
1l 2.6 1.52.0 1.5 14.6
P stands for peaks and T for
troughs according to the annual chronologies. S.D.standard deviation.
Source: Great Britain: Burns and Mitchell 19'46, table 16, p. 79;United
States: 1790—1833, Thorp 1926, 113—26; 18314-55, Burns andMitchell 19'16,




















7 3.61.5 1.1 0.14 14.7
7 3.01.5 1.6 1.0 14.6






















































NOTE: All entries are durations in months. For abbreviationssee note to Table 1.
aExcIude the wartime expansions (CivilWar, World
War), the Immediate postwar contractions, and the
expansions and postwar contractions.
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research, tnc. See Burnsand Mitchell 19146, Table 16
and text, chapter 4, and Moore and arnowitz 1986, TableA.3 and text, pp. 745—54.
Period
Number Expansion (T to F) Contraction (P to T) Cycle (T to T)
Mean S.D. MeanS.D.
(3) (4) (5) (6)
1.1854—1919 16 27 10
'2.1919—19i45 6 35 26
3.1945—1982 8 45 28
4.1854-198230 33 20





















































58 25 61 28
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Wars I and II, Korean War, and Vietnam
full cycles that include wartime6
United States Great Britain France Germany
Expansions 10—50 8—614 8-62 16—61
Contractions 7-65 6-81 8-68 12-61
Full cycles (T to T) 28—99 26—135 214_95 28—102
Thus conventional measures show large differences over time between the
observed fluctuations in general economic activity, in terms of both their
overall length and division by upward and downward movements, for each of the
four countries covered. But these statistics include outliers -somevery
long and very short expansions and contractions -whichare relatively few and
far between. It is important to allow for stochastic and exogenous elements
in business cycle dynamics.
Here one might note first the tendency of wartime expansions to be
protracted and of immediate postwar contractions to be brief. This is most
apparent for the U.S., mainly because peacetime expansions were on the whole
longer in the other countries. When wartime cycles are excluded,
substantially lower variability measures result, as shown in Table 2 for the
U.S. (of. lines 1_14 and 5-8). The coefficients of variation are reduced from
61% to 1414% for expansions and from 143% to 35% for trough—to-trough cycles,
18514_ 1982.
The requirements for periodicity can be relaxed by treating the extreme
duration classes as "outliers". Ten of the 14 U.S. peacetime cycles of 18514—
1919 had expansions in the range of 1 to 2 years, and ten had contractions
in the range of 1 to 2 years. All but two of these cycles (86%) lasted 2 to
years from trough to trough. This way of looking at the duration figures
brings out better their central tendency, that is, the predominance in this
era of American economic history of relatively short movements among business
cycles as defined by the Mational Bureau.7
Note that even this truncation still leaves room formuch variability
(the one-year ranges amount to a doubling of thelengths of the phases).
Nevertheless, some contributors to the field are content to bestow the
attribute of "periodicity" upon fluctuations so distributed.1This may be
semantically legitimate but the common practice seems to defineperiodicity
morestrictly.At any rate, judging from the NBER historicalchronologies
alone, business cycles would indeed be best describedas "recurrent but not
periodic." This characterization is part of the muchquoted working
definition of Mitchell 1927 and Burns and Mitchell 1946that has survived well
several decades of active research applications and
testing.
In Europe business cycles were on theaverage longer and hence fewer than
in the United States. Thus in the commonperiod 1879-1938 trough-to-trough
cycles numbered 17, 13, 14, and 10 in the U.S., GreatBritain, France, and
Germany, respectively. The mean duration of the Americancycles in that
period was four years; the corresponding figures for theother economies are I
approximately 4-5 years. To account for most of theearly cycles in the
foreign countries, it is necessary to work withranges of several years. Of
the eleven British cycles of 1854—1919, forexample, seven lasted 4—8 years;
nine expansions were 2&-4, seven contractions2-3k years long. The results
for France and Germany are notvery different.
The average duration figures for the interwarperiod (1919—38) resemble
those for the earlier decades in the case of U.S.(Table 2, lines 5 and 6).
They are smaller than their pre-1919 counterpartselsewhere, except for the
long contractions in Britain, which wasgenerally depressed much of that time
very clear example is Brittori 1986; see pp. 1-4 for hisgeneral discussion
of this issue with references to the literatureand an alternative treatment
in Zarnowitz 1985.8
(lines 9—10, 12-13, and 15—16). The dispersion measuresare relatively high,
reflecting the particularly diverse experienceof this turbulent era.
2. Multiple-Period and Long-Wave Hypotheses
The Burns-Mitchell definition imposes on business cyclescertain minimum
requirements of amplitude and scope as well as length,but only in very
general and flexible terms. It thus allowsfor a great diversity of behavior,
yet it treats the cycle as a single category.But some scholars prefer to use
different concepts leading to hypotheses of several interacting cycles,each
with its own characteristic frequency. It is then thecombination of
concurrent cycles with different intensities and durationsthat produces the
seeming lack of periodicity. Different factors are responsiblefor major and
minor cycles and perhaps still shorter subcycles. The existenceof one or two
types of a much longer wave comprising a numberof the NBER-dated business
cycles has also been asserted and investigated. Itis clear that these
approaches require more complex analyses and larger databases than the
common-cycle hypothesis.
Here it is important to recognize that business cycles involve numerous
activities and are not adequately represented by specific cycles in any single
variable; also, that no comprehensive time series exist to covertheir long
and varied history. For these reasons, it is more difficult to assessthe
relative amplitudes than the relative durations of business cycles,and indeed
we know less about the former than the latter. But testsof models with
multiple periodicities must rely on differences in the size asmuch as on
those in the length of general economic fluctuations.
It is of course likely, that durations and amplitudes of cyclical
movements are positively correlated. The prevalence of short and mild
recessions works in this direction. But the relationship is not easy to9
document and probably not strong, though it seems clearer forexpansions than
contractions (see Moore 1961, pp. 86-93; Zarnowitz 1981,sec. VI). Certainly,
the length of fluctuations is not a very reliable indicator of theirsize.
Some of the U.S contractions were long and severe (1839_13,1873—79, 1929—33),
some were long but moderate (1882-86, 19O2_0L), still others were short but
severe (1907-08, 1937-38). Similar examples can be found for othercountries.
Over nearly 150 years between the American Revolution and thelow point
of the Great Depression, U.S. wholesale prices followedlong upward trends in
three periods (1789_181z, 181I3_6z, and 1896—1920) andlong downward trends in
three intervening periods (181Z_43, 18614_96, and 1920—32). Ineach of the
intervals of secular inflation (deflation) expansionswere long (short)
relative to contractions. This relationship wasrepeatedly observed and
confirmed, also in the British, French, and German data (Burns and Mitchell
1916, oh. 11; Moore 1983, oh. 15; Zarnowitz and Moore 1986,pp. 525-31). The
dates of the uptrend-downtrend sequences in theprice levels provide fair
approximations to the "long waves" introduced by Kondratieff in 1926and
adopted with various modifications and interpretations by a number of
economists over the years.2 The long price movementsare attributable largely
to trends in money and credit creation, and relatedinfluences of gold
discoveries and wars. In the short run, pricesgenerally tend to move
procyclicafly around their longer trends, which presumably reflectsa dominant
role of fluctuations in aggregate demand.
A downswing phase of a long wave is supposed to beassociated with
average growth rates of technological innovation, capital formation, and
2These include Schumpeter1939; Dupriez 1917, 1978; Rostow 1978, 1980; Mandel
1980; and van Duijn 1983, who provides a useful criticalsurvey of literature and evidence.10
industrial production that are lower than those in the preceding and following
upswing phases. According to van Duijn 1983 (part III),the results based on
composite indexes aggregated across the main capitalisteconomies are broadly
consistent with these hypotheses, while the tests for the individual countries
tend to be negative, which is attributed to "national peculiarities" (p.
1514). But there are so few of the long wave phases that such results can
hardly be conclusive. The evidence for the "1st Kondratieff" (before18142-51)
is shown to be defective. In the post-World War II period, the "l4th
Kondratieff" prosperity phase is dated 19148—66, followed by a "recession" in
1966-73, and a "depression" in 1973—? But this chronology is, to say the
least, doubtful. The 1970s and 1980s so far are much less depressed than the
previous periods so classified, 1872-83 and 1929-37. Growth rates have
declined but are positive most of the time in most places, and there is no
general deflation and financial crisis.
More generally, the problem of identifying the long-wave turns with the
available data is a truly formidable one (for early times, because of the
paucity and defects of the information; for recent times, because of
inevitable truncations and revisions). The smoothing out of the effects of
other, much more pronounced movements (both the shorter cycles and the longest
trend) presents no lesser difficulty. Several old and new tests of the long-.
wave and composite—cycle hypotheses produced largely negative results (Burns
and Mitchell 19146, oh. 11; Adelman 1965; Howrey 1968). But here again the
fewness of relevant observations is a major problem, particularly for the
tests based on spectral analysis. This recently favored method is well suited
for the task of discovering hidden periodicities but only in relatively long,
stationary and homoskedastic time series, i.e., under conditions that clearly
do not obtain in the present context.11
There is much disagreement about the very existence of some of thelong
waves even among the supporters of the concept, and more disagreement yet
about the timing of the waves and their phases. This is In sharp contrast to
business cycles, where chronologies from different sources are notvery
different and the NBER reference dates are widely accepted and used. There is
probably no better proof that the uncertainties surrounding the long wavesare
indeed unusually large.
Industrial production and early estimates of total output, when smoothed
so as to reduce the influence of shorter business cycles, show 15 to20-year
fluctuations In the growth rates for the United States between 18140and
19114. These movements, clearly associated with waves in the levelof
construction activity, are known as Kuznets cycles. Theirexplanation relies
heavily on the role of population growth, and notably the tides ofimmigration
from Europe, as sources of both additional laborsupply and demand for new
housing and other capital goods. The demographic forces are treatedas
interacting with economic developments, not as exogenous variables. Other
important factors in these analyses include growth retardations inEurope,
territorial and railway expansions in America, changes in thecurrent balance
and international capital flows, and constraints on themoney supply under the
prevailing specie standard.
Much has been learned from the literature dealing with thesedevelopments
(a.o., Kuznets 1930; Burns 1934; Long 19140; Abramovitz 1964; Easterlin
1968). But some of the central elements in the Kuznetscycles as sketched
above are now recognized as belonging to history. Thistype of fluctuation,
therefore, is no longer evident in recent times, even though it isprobably
not entirely unrelated to long-term deviations from trends inthe interwar and
post-World War II periods (Abramovitz 1968; Rostow 1975).12
3. Major and Minor Cycles
Unlike the deeply hidden long wave and the building cycle that apparently
ceased to operate some time ago, major and minor cycles certainly exist as two
very different categories, at least at the descriptivelevel. One can hardly
object to this distinction as exemplified by the sequences of 1921433-37 (the
deepest contraction and a large but still incomplete recovery, both very long)
and 1957—58-60 (a moderate and short interruption of growth). What is not so
clear is how to define the major and minor cycles more precisely; whether they
constitute a true, systematic dichotomy; and whether at least some major
cycles consist of two or more minor ones.
Juglar 1862 was the first to observe that fluctuations In prices,
interest rates, and other financial variables often lasted about 7-11 years.
Kitchin 1923 stressed the primacy of 3_Liyearcycles; the major cycles were to
him "merely aggregates" of two or three minor ones (p. 10). In time it caine
to be widely believed that business investment in machinery and equipment
plays a central part In the major or Juglar cycles, inventory investment in
the minor or Kitchin cycles. The former involve longer decision and
implementation lags than the latter. Fixed capital lasts for years and cannot
be adjusted to desired levels nearly as quickly as inventories that are
normally disposed of in days, weeks, or at most months.
The NBER chronologies cannot be dichotomized into the Kitchin and the
Juglar durations. Of the 14cyclesin Great Britain 1792-1858, six lasted 314
years,six 5-6 years, and two 7 years each from trough to trough. The
corresponding U.S. cycles include three of 2 years each, four of 31 years,
four of 5—6 years, and three of' 7-9 years. The monthly data used for 1854-
1938 permit more detail. Let the classes of 3O—5t months and 78 months or
more serve as the Kitchin and Juglar durations, respectively: they would13
account for 31% and 25% of the observations forBritain, 71% and 10% for the
United States. The rest would fall in between,except for a few very short
fluctuations. Thesemeasures,then, are definitely affirmative only on the
historical prevalence of short cycles in the U.S.chronology.
Schumpeter 1935 held that "every Juglar so far observed...Isreadily
divisible into three cycles of a period ofroughly forty months" (p.
8). Not surprisingly,no arrangement of the NBER consecutive businesscycles
into groups of three corresponds to theJuglar dates attributable to
Schuxnpeter. Instead, his nine Juglar cycles marked offby troughs between
1848 and 1932 can be approximatedby four groups of two cycles each, four of
three cycles each, and one single cycle (Burnsand Mitchell 1946, pp. 440-2).
But there is no good reason to insiston any particular fixed scheme of
so many Kitchins per Juglar, and a more relaxedapproach maybemore
instructive. When major cycles are marked offby troughs of severe
depressions according to the U.S. monthly referencedates (in 1879, 1894,
1908, 1921, and 1933), their successiveperiods are roughly 15, 14, 13, and 12
years. The corresponding dates for Great Britainare not far off and they
yield similar durations, namely 16, 14, 13, and 11years. These periods
include 4, 4, 4, and 3 successive businesscycles in the United States, and 2,
3, 3, and 3 business cycles in Great Britain. Burnsand Mitchell admitthat
this result "suggests a fair degree ofuniformity" and, upon further analysis,
find some evidence of "a partial cumulationof successive cycles."
Nonetheless, they conclude that "the (observed) relationsare not sufficiently
3Also that "the twocomplete Kondratieff units ...containeach of them six
cycles of from nine to ten years' duration."Schumpeter attributed
periodicjtjes of 54—60 years, 9-10years, and 40 months or "somewhat less" to
the Kondratjeff, Juglar, and Kitchincycles, respectively. His full treatment
admists some exceptions (1939, vol. I,pp. 161-74).114
regular ...tojustify us in regarding the business cycles separated by severe
depressions as subdivisions of long cycles" (op. cit., p. 1460).
This is a tentative judgment conditioned on the deficient available data,
not a decisive rejection of all notions of periodicity. But whatever
configurations of minor and major cycles may have prevailed in the half-
century here considered, they did not continue in the following era.The
short but severe slump of 1937-38 occurred only five years after the end of
the great contraction of 1929-33. After World War II, U.S. business
expansions have grown much longer and their durations more dispersed, in
comparison with the pre-19145 and especially the pre-1919 cycles. This was due
in large part, but by no means only, to the incidence of wars (of. lines 1—8,
columns 1-2 in Table 2). On the other hand, contractions became much shorter
and much less variable (columns 3_)4). Of the eight recessions since 19148,
even the longest and largest (1973-75, 1981-82) were far less severe than
earlier depressions such as those of 1920-21 and 1937-38, let alone 1929-33
(see Zarnowitz 1985, pp. 526—28; Moore and Zarnowitz 1986, pp. 767-71).
Thus if major cycles were to be defined as involving deep depressions,
they could not be found at all in the economic history of the United States
after the 1930s. What can clearly be identified is fluctuations in growth
rates of total output that lasted longer than the average business cycle.
Specifically, in 19148-55 and 1955-61, real GNP rose at compound annual rates
of 14.14% and 2.2%, respectively. This period of 13 years included four
recessions. In 1961-73 growth measured in the sametermswas 14.0%, in 1973-86
it was 2.3%. This period of 25 years also included four recessions. But no
indication of any definite periodicities emerges from this division.
To see this, note that the first of these two extended retardations was
less than half the length of the second one, and the end of the latter is as15
yet undetermined. Note also the uneven incidence of businesscycle phases
within the two periods: 19I8—55 and 1955-61 include tworecessions each,
1961-73 only one, 1973—86 three. Since 1973 growth rates fellwell below the
previous experience and expectations in all major capitalist economies.This
may be due to a variety of sources of changes in labor and capital
productivity distinguished in the studies of "growth accounting" (Maddison
1987). Oil price rises have attracted particularattention, but policy errors
and disruptions first of high inflation and thendisinflation are probably
also among the major immediate causes of whathappened.
To be sure, there is room for differentinterpretations of history, the
more so the earlier and less reliable are the data.Long wave proponents such
as van Duijn perceive three Juglars in the postwarera, 191857, 1957—66, and
1966—73 (1983, ch. IX). But there was no businessrecession in the United
States in 1966, only a short and mildslowdown; also this breakdown does not
produce any large differences between growth rates Inoutput for the aggregate
of the major countries (Ibid.p. 1511).
Matthews 1959, using troughs in all contractionsexcept the shortest
ones, counts seven major cycles for the United States between 1876and 1938,
with durations averaging 9 years (standarddeviation, 3; range, 4-13). But he
observes that "the periodicity is notreally very good" and that "the
circumstances surrounding the middlingdepressions were so diverse that it is
difficult to regard them as the manifestation ofa regular cyclical
tendency." Hence, he sees "distinct forces making forperiodicity" at work
only in the cycles of 3-4 and about 20years dominated by movements in
inventory Investment and house-building,respectively (pp.cit., pp. 208—15).
For Great Britain, Matthews notes theearly dominance of major cycles, of
which four occurred In the relativelypeaceful period 1825-65, ranging from 816
to 12 and averaging 10 years (in addition to more numerous shorter and milder
fluctuations). Between 18714 and 1907 four additional peak-to-peak cycles in
national income occurred, lasting from 7 to 10 and averaging 8 years, but
these are attributed mainly to an alternation of two much longer,
unsychronized swings in domestic and foreign investment, a situation seen as
unlikely to recur (ibid., pp. 215-26).
In short, it is fair to say that direct inferences from time-series data
in annual or shorter units, without resort to any elaborate smoothing or
filtering procedures, lend little support to the concept of well-defined
periodicities that apply to economic fluctuations across time and space. It
is in the work of those authors who are sympathetic or committed to this
concept that the problems encountered by the periodicity hypotheses are most
visible.
4.Fluctuationsin Detrended Series
Themeasuresin Tables 1 and 2 are based on the consensus of movements in
time series that include long-term trends as well as cyclical fluctuations
(only the seasonal variations are routinely removed). Alternative
chronologies have been constructed from comovements of cyclical dimensions
found in trend-adjusted data. In the upward (downward) phases of these
"growth cycles," the economy grows at an average rate higher (lower) than its
long-term trend rate. Hence not only absolute declines but also sufficiently
large and long slowdowns can and do give rise to such detrended cycles.
Retardations often precede contractions, and then growth cycles have
shorter upward phases, earlier peaks, and longer downward phases than the
corresponding business cycles, i.e., they are more nearly symmetrical.
Sometimes a major slowdown occurs but no contraction follows, as in 1951—52,
1962-64, and 1966—67 in the United States (the period after mid-1984 may or17
maynotturn out to fall into the samecategory).So growth cycles outnumber
business cycles. However, it is also possible for a low growthphase to
include a short and incomplete business cycle recovery, though onlyone case
of this sort was documented so far: 1975—82 witnessed two businesscycles but
only one growth cycle.
When very strong upward trends prevail, growth cyclesmay replace
business cycles, that is, phases of below—normal but stillpositive growth
occur instead of contractions. In the long sweep of modern history, this
appears to have happened on a large scale only in Europe and Japan during the
great post-World War II reconstruction of the 19LOs and 1950s. The condition
may therefore be a temporary and uncommon one, except perhaps for small
nations engaged in the process of rapid industrialization andbuildup of
exports. It is the observed postwar development that led to thecontemporary
definition of "growth cycles" and their dating formany countries (Mintz 1969;
Klein and Moore 1985).
Since trends vary across the different indicator series for eachcountry
and generally also over time, their eliminationmight well reduce both the
temporal variability and the spatial differentiation of the observed
fluctuations. One would therefore wish tocompare growth cycles with business
cycles with respect to their respective regularities.
Table 3 suggests, first, considerable similarity between the durations of
growth cycles in the principal economies with relatively unrestrictedprivate
enterprise and trade. The higher growth phases averaged 30—39 months for
eight of the countries covered, 19 and 22 months for the U.S. and Canada. The
low-growth phases averaged 17-22 months, except for United Kingdom and West
Germany, with 28 and 30 months, respectively. Total growth cycles, whether







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(about five years for Switzerland and threeyears for Canada, to take the
range). Some of the discrepancies reflect differences in the timecoverage.
Inspection of the dates of successive growth cycles in the different countries
show a good deal of correspondence between these chronologies. Thisconfirms
the old lesson that most of the larger fluctuations are transmittedor
diffused internationally (see Moore and Zarnowitz 1986, section 8, for
detail).
Second, the variability of growth—cycle durations over time is less then
that of business cycles but still large. For the United States19148-82,
standard deviations are 50, 52, 145, and 314 percent of themean lengths of
high—growth and low-growth phases, trough-to-trough and peak-to-peakgrowth
cycles, respectively. The corresponding ratios for businessexpansions,
contractions, and total cycle durations are 61, 67, 143, and 147 percent. The
range is 25-93 months for growth cycles, 28—117 months for business cycles.
The results for other countries are similar,e.g., the ranges of growth cycles
in Japan, United Kingdom, France, and WestGermany are 140-99, 142-914, 141-70,
and 141—98 months, respectively.
It is important to recognize that growth cyclesare more difficult to
identify than business cycles, and are not as well defined and measured. In
recent years, it was often taken for granted that trends andcycles have
different causes and effects. They used to be treatedas independent, e.g.,
the long trend in real GNP as a deterministic function oftime, the cycle as a
stationary second-order autoregressive process around that time trend(Kydland
and Prescott 1980; Blanchard 1981). This isnow being strongly challenged by
the view that the trends are themselvesstochastic, and total output as well
as other important macroeconomic series are stationaryonly after differencing
(Nelson and Plosser 1982).20
In an instructive article, Harvey 1985 argues in favor of a structured
approach to modeling time series as containing unobservedstochastic trend and
cycle components. He finds the properties of annualseries on output,
unemployment, consumer prices, and stock prices to be verydifferent for
periods ending in 19L7 (with starting dates from1860 to 1909) and the period
19L8_70. For the earlier years "the cycle is an intrinsic part of the trend
rather than a separate component that can just be added on afterwards." For
19L8_70 "a faint cycle can be detected ...[buta] stochastic trend model is
sufficient," while "after 1970 ...itcould be argued that the reintroduction
of a cyclical component is desirable" (p. 225). Not surprisingly, the short
cycles of the early postwar period appear but faintly when annualunits are
used. The dispute continues but there is increasing evidence that the
permanent components in business cycles are much larger than was previously
assumed (Campbell and Mankiw 1987). All this may be interpreted as a revival
of certain time-honored ideas: that trends are not very stable over long
periods of time but subject to intermittent or sequential changes; thattrends
and cycles interact in various ways; and that, therefore, the separation of
trends and cycles may be associated with serious errors (see Zarnowitz 1981
and 1987 for further discussion of this topic and references).
5. How Regular Are Investment Cycles?
What evidence is there that inventory investment is a source of minor
cycles, fixed investment of major cycles? Studies of the historical record
indicate that the relative importance of changes in business inventories is
very large in short and weak fluctuations, much smaller inthe long and strong
ones, whereas the opposite is typically the case for investmentin plant and
equipment. Stocks of goods held for current production and sale are generally
subject to prompter and less costly adjustments than stocks of structuresand21
equipment on hand. Indeed, inventory investment is visibly more volatile than
investment in "fixed" capital. It is likely to drop in any recession, mildor
severe, but will also at times show declines of some persistence during long
business expansions. Fixed capital investment has fewer "extra" movements of
this kind. Yet comprehensive series on real investment of all types have a
high degree of cyclical conformity, i.e., they tend to move in broad swings
whose duration and timing match well the business cycles as dated by NBER. If
there are any systematic differences in periodicities here, theyappear not to
be sharp enough to be demonstrable by simple methods of comparing "specific
cycles" in individual time series with "reference cycles" in aggregate
economic activity.
Thetechniquesof spectral analysis are well designed to serve the
purposes of detecting and examining cyclical patterns or periodicities in
large samples of data on stationary processes. They have been successfully
used as such in natural sciences and engineering. In econometricapplications
their usefulness is often limited by the small size of availablesamples of
consistent data and the prevalence of nonstationary processes.
Most economic aggregates contain strong upward trends. Their short—
period changes are highly autocorrelated and small relative to their
contemporaneous levels. The power spectra estimated for such series show
sharp peaks at the lowest, steep declines at rising, and flat declines at the
highest frequencies) Such convex curves relating power inversely to
frequency (hence positively to the cycle period) were found to be relatively
smooth, except for peaks at seasonal frequencies, and labeled "the typical
This would be so whether the trendsare deterministic or stochastic, the
underlying time series models of the ARIMA class or AR(1) with coefficients
close to one. For a discussion of the broadrange of interpretations of
spectra with this shape, see Granger and Newbold 1977, pp. 53—55, 63—65.22
spectral shape" (Granger 1966). In a spectrum so dominated by the long
movement of the series, cyclical features turned out to be very diluted and
difficult to identify. But this was soon recognized as a technical problem,
not a proof of the unimportance of business cycles in general. For series
that are trendless or detrended, more interesting spectra can be estimated.
Differericing Is often recommended and used. Howrey 1972 calculates spectra
for real GNP and its major expenditure components In both first-difference and
linear-detrended form. He finds using the change series preferable but the
results are generally consistent. His conclusion is that "These estimates
indicate, from a descriptive point of view, the reality of three—to five-year
business cycles, particularly in the investment series" (p. 617). The
relative peaks that emerge lack statistical significance according to
conventional tests, but this result is attributed to the shortness of the time
series used.5
Another large problem in empirical applications of the analysis relates
to the degree of smoothing used to produce the spectral density estimates.
For very long consistent time series that may contain a large number of
cycles, smoothing with weighted moving averages with many constants (a
"truncation point" equal to one fourth or one third of the sample size, for
example) can be appropriate. For the short series (small samples) usually
available in economics, such smoothing may be too heavy. Hillinger 1986
contends that it results in attenuation of spectral peaks at business-cycle
frequency bands as in the "typical" spectral shapes. He presents unsmoothed
spectra for quarterly series 1960_814, which show pronounced peaks only at
5See Howrey, op. cit., p. 62L, where references to Adelman 1965 and Howrey
1968 are used to argue that studies of longer series "indicate more strikingly
the relative importance of business-cycle variation."23
business-cycle periods (roughly in the ranges of 3.5—8 and 3.5—10years for
West Germany and the United States, respectively). But the unsmoothed
spectra, like the closely related periodograms, have unsatisfactory properties
of their own, and in particular lack consistency.6
Charts 1—14 and Table 14 present the results of anexploratory application
of spectral analysis to quarterly seasonally adjusted serieson investment in
inventories, equipment, nonresidential structures, and housing for United
States, 1919-141 and 19I886. Unsmoothed and lightly smoothed (3-lag and7—
lag) spectra are examined.7 The post-World War II data come from thenational
income and product accounts compiled by the CommerceDepartment, the prewar
data are new estimates by Gordon and Veitch 1986, all inconstant dollars.
The series on change in business inventoriesrequired no transformation, the
other series, which show approximately log-lineartrends, are cast in form of
relative rates of change (specifically, log differences).
The inventory series for 19148—86 show well-articulatedpeaks at periods
of 30, 146, and 65 months in both the unsmoothed (SO)and 3-lag (S3) spectra.
In the 7-lag (S7) spectrum, there is also apeak at 2 years and a gently
rising plateau between 14 and 5 years. The prewar SO haspeaks at 18, 27, 314,
and 68 months; S3 matches the first two of thesewell, the next two poorly,
6That Is, the variance ofthe estimate does not tend to zero as the sample
size tends to infinity. Also, the covariance betweenestimates at different
frequencies decreases steadily with the sample size, so that forlong series
the risk of finding spurious periodicities ishigh. But these are strong
reasons to use high degrees of smoothing for largesamples (increasing
relative to the sample size); they are not goodarguments for applying long
moving averages to spectra of very short series that cover few business
cycles.
7The spectral windowswere obtained with simple triangular weighting:1 2 1
for the 3-lag and 1 2 3 4 3 2 1 for the7-lag smoothed spectra. The SAS/ETS
SPECTRA procedure was used in the calculations (seeSAS/ETS User's Guide, 5th


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 Two Lags (S3)
3FourLags (S7)
14 Unsmoothed (SO)
5 Two Lags (S3)
6 Four Lags (S7)
7 Unsmoothed (SO)
8 Two Lags (S3)
9 Four Lags (S7)
10 Unsmoothed (SO)
11 Two Lags (S3)






























bEntries in parentheses refer to low or flat peaks.
CEstimates based on data in 1972 dollars
dEstimates based on data in 1982 dollars
elnventory investment component of real GNP, used as reported.
change in the logarithms of the series (quarterly log differences).
Source: 1919—141, Gordon and Veitch 1986 (updated version of data in Balke and
Gordon 1986). 19148-86, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of
Commerce (national income and product accounts).
32
Table1$
Peaks in Unsmoothed and Smoothed Spectra for Quarterly Series
of Investment in Equipment, Structures, Inventories, and Housing,
1919_Ill and 19118—86























andST is relatively high between 1-2 years only (of. Charts 1A and lB and
Table It, lines 1—3). The strong procyclical movements of inventory investment
in both the pewar and the post war years is well documented (for a recent
study of the 1929-83 period, see Blinder and Holtz-Eakin 1986). Measurement
errors in the inventory investment data for the pre—1929 period may be
responsible for the relative weakness of business cycle indications in the
smoothed spectra for 1919_in..8
The 19148-86 spectra for producers' durable equipment show relativepeaks
at frequencies very similar to those located in the correspondingspectra for
inventory investment, and these peaks show up in the smoothed curves as well,
although much flattened. The 30- and 50-month peaks also appear, and more
strongly, in the postwar spectra for both nonresidential and residential
structures, but here there are some signs of m.zch shorter and muchlonger
cycles as well. (Cf. Charts 2A-2D and Table 44, columns 5-8).
In the 1919-41 period, the 68-month cycle peaksappear in the SO spectra
for all three categories of fixed investment as well as thechange in business
inventories but disappear or show up but weakly in the smoothedcurves. The
same is true of the 314-month peaks, except for nonresidential structures where
this cycle seems to be at least one year longer. The fixed-investmentspectra
also suggest some very short (9-month) and short (about 2—year)cycles. (Cf.
Charts lA—iD and Table 14, columns 114).
In view of the unresolved problems and doubts noted earlier in this
8See Gordon and Veitch 1986,appendix pp. 328-35, for a description of the
data. Since their estimates of inventory investment were derived as
residuals, they may have larger errors than the other series, especially for
the early years covered. The Chow-Lin 1971 interpolation methodwas used to
convert the annual series to quarterly observations. For producers' durable
equipment, industrial production of' producers' goods served as the basis for
the interpolation; for plant and housing, industrial and residentialbuilding
contracts and construction indexes were similarly employed.314
section,it seems best to treat these results simply as provisional without
trying to test them in any formal way. Yet they are suggestive.The spectral
peaks in Table I, column 7, correspond to periods of 146, 51,and 57 months,
all very close to the average durations of business cycles before and after
World War II (53—56 months, see Table 2, lines 2 and 3). The longest cycles
represented by relative peaks near 5—6 years (Table 14, columns 14 and 8) also
fit in well with the observed durations of major macroeconomic fluctuations
since 1919. This is not the case for those spectral peaks of inventory
investment that correspond to periods of 1-2 years, which are shorter even
than the average growth cycles of about 3 years (cf. Table L, lines 1-3 and
Table 3, line 1). But these results are at least in rough accord with the
general notion that inventory investment generates short fluctuations, and
indeed graphs of other spectrum estimates show similar local maxima (Howrey
1972; Hillinger 1986).
The observation that seems most difficult to explain is the apparent
prominence of very short fluctuations in all divisions of fixed investment.
More generally, the limitations of analyses and evidence of this type need to
be stressed. Too many periodicities emerge in unsmoothed spectra, too few
survive even relatively light smoothing. Aggregation across these and other
components would be expected to produce much weaker and probably less periodic
fluctuations in total output and employment.35
III. Models and Problems
1. LimIt Cycles and Random and Exogenous Shocks
Certain theories can produce strictly periodic fluctuations: a classic
example is the nonlinear model of a limit cycle bounded between exogenously
given "floor" and "ceiling" growth trajectories.8 In the deterministic case,
if the parameters of this model were to remain constant, the cycles would
repeat themselves perfectly. This, of course, is not the observed or expected
outcome, so random shocks must be added to nonlinear models too, but they play
a relatively small role in systems with limit cycles. Major departures from
periodicity may require changes over time in the basic parameters of models in
this class. Such changes are indeed likely in a world with structural change
and occasional large disturbances (e.g., wars). They are contemplated in
discussions of some of these models but are not incorporated in the models or
otherwise explained.
81n Hicks 1950 the floor andceiling lines have identical slopes equal to the
long trend growth rate. The floor is set by the minimum rate of gross
investment, which includes an autonomous part and maintenance of the current
stock of capital; the ceiling by the limits on the resources available at full
employment. Net investment is in large part induced by lagged changes in
output, with a high value for the accelerator coefficient. Interacting with
the lagged consumption-income (multiplier) relation, this acceleratorwould,
in the unconstrained case, cause output to grow exponentially. But, once set
in motion by some initial impulse, an expansion will be slowedupon reaching
the ceiling, and in the resulting downswing the accelerator is suspended until
positive growth Is again resumed when output falls to the floor and starts
moving up along it.
It is Important to note that the model could be relaxed in severalways
to allow for differentiation of the enodgenous and self-perpetuating cycles
that it produces. (1) The accelerator could be such as to correspond toa
cyclically explosive rather than a monotonically explosive solution. (2)
Investment that is "autonomous", i.e. caused by factors other than thechange
in output, may fluctuate, say for technological or financialreasons.(3)
Weak cycles may occur in which the ceiling is riot reached. (4) Some
variations may be admitted in the rate of growth of full-employment output and
in the sizes and lag patterns of the accelerator and multiplier. SeeHicks,
op. cit, passim and expecially ch. IX.36
Randomdisturbances do have an essential part in the dynamically stable
(i.e., damped) linear models which, unless repeatedly shocked, cannot produce
a continuing cycle. The output of such damped systems is represented by a
second-order linear difference equation with a white-noise term u, that is, y
ay_1 -by_2+U, withcomplex roots and b < 1 in absolute value (also,a2 <
kb). When b is very close to unity, there is little damping and the
periodicity is relatively high and easy to recognize; when b is lower (say,
near 0.8), damping is strong and periodicity is weak and no longer visible.
(For a demonstration of these relations by means of long—run stochastic
computer simulations, see Britton 1986, pp. 7—9.)
Itis only the small white—noise shocks densely distributed through time
that serve as a possible source of periodicity in the damped linear models.
Large specific shocks that are discontinuous and sporadic are likely to make
business cycles and their phases less rather than more regular. Such
disturbances can be caused by wars, large strikes and bankruptcies, price
bubbles, foreign debt and financial crises, price cartel actions, and major
shifts in fiscal and monetary policies. They will be particularly important
when autocorrelated, which they probably often are. The conclusion of
Blanchard and Watson 1986 that business cycles are affected by both small and
large shocks but dominated by neither (and hence not "all alike") is plausible
but as yet not well established. Simulations of large econometric models show
them to possess but weak cyclicality properties to which relatively little is
contributed by random noise. Serially correlated error terms in the model
equations and exogenous variables have stronger effects, but generally the
inacroeconometric models are heavily damped and fail to account for much of the
cyclical instability observed in past and recent data (Hicanan 1972; Zarnowitz
1972 a and b; Eckstein and Sinai 1986).37
2.Government andthe Business Cycle
The "political business cycle" (PBC) is a simple ideasuggestive of
periodicity: Government policies aimed at winning elections for theparty in
power manage to manipulate inflation and unemployment so as to generate
inverse cycles in the two variables with turning points associated withthe
electoral campaigns and voting dates. Where the latter arefixed, as in the
case of the four-year presidential cycle in the United States, theso induced
fluctuations should have a strong tendency to be periodic. Thishypothesis
led to a considerable amount of interesting work onpopularity functions
relating electoral results to macroeonomic variables and reaction functions
relating instruments to potential targets of economic policies. But the
results vary and on the whole fail to be clearly supportive of the PBC
models. This is not surprising, since it is doubtful that thecontemplated
policies can be sufficiently well timed and executed; also, that thepublic
will continually accept, or be fooled by, such policies ifthey succeed, and
tolerate them if they fail.
Business cycles go back a long time during the era ofrelatively small
governments of limited economic functions and influence; but they havechanged
in various ways since, reflecting the evolution of themodern economy in both
its private and public aspects (Gordon 1986). It iscertainly important to
study these changes and the role of government transactions,institutions, and
policies in contemporary macroeconomic dynamics. Butincreasingly it is
recognized that the most promising way to proceed in this direction isby
treating the government as part of the endogenous processgenerating the
economy's movement. Government policy makers as well as privateagents react
to actual and expected economic developments inpursuit of their objectives,
despite the important (though partial) differences in themotivations, nature,38
and effects of their actions. There is both conflict and cooperation in the
resulting process, with elements of complex gaines among the major partners,
notably central banks and treasuries on one side, financial markets,business
associations, and labor unions on the other.
Much hard work will have to be done to improve our understanding of these
interactions, but some aspects of the story can be captured by extensionsof
current textbook models of the relations between output and interest rates
(IS—LM) and output and prices (AD-AS). Fiscal and monetary policies affect IS
and LM respectively, and hence aggregate demand, AD; they also respond to
shifts in IS, LM, AD and aggregate supply AS that are caused by forces outside
the government. What is needed is (1) to make the system dynamic by
introducing lags and/or norilinearities, and (2) to make the policy variables
endogenous by specifying how they react to changes in economic conditions.
(However, this does not, in principle, preclude allowing for autonomous and
stochastic elements in government actions, which are probably often
substantial.)
The simplest approach is to use lags in the determination of prices (F)
as well as output (Q), which may be due to slow and uncertain information,
costs of rapid adjustments, desired implicit or explicit contract
arrangements, or deviations from perfect competition. If then AD shifts up so
that Q exceeds its full-employment level at the existing level of prices,
there will occur a gradual upward adjustment in F and eventually also in
expected prices peThis will cause wages and other costs to rise and hence
AS to move up, so that over time Q will fall back to Q1. If AD shifts down
and Q declines below QN, lagged downward adjustments of P and pe will follow,
so AS will move down and Q will slowly rise back to The driving force
here is the variation in demand; supply adjusts at prices and wages that are39
predetermined and slow to change, which explains the long lags involved.9
The fluctuations In AD could be the work solely of real forcesin the
private economy, as in the accelerator-multiplier interactionmodels, or
solely of changes in money supply dominated by central bankactions, as in a
simple exogenous monetarist model. An early formal model that combinesreal
and monetary factors within a privateeconomy is Hicks 1950 (ohs. 11 and 12),
where an IS-LM cobweb-type cycle is super imposedupon the nonlinear-
accelerator core part of the system. This monetary cobwebresults from the
Joint operation of long distributed lags in consumption and investmentand
shorter discrete lags in the demand for andsupply of "bank money." This is
an endogenous theory of a "monetary crisis" leading toa sharp rise in
liquidity preference (a "credit crunch" in the more recent parlance).
Early students of business cycles saw no particular reason togive much
attention to government activities. Keynesians havelong treated the
government as exogenous and having a large potential forreducing instability
by countercyclical fiscal policies, income transfers andsubsidies or
insurance schemes that keep up the volume of autonomousspending. The idea
that government actions may be stronglydestabilizing Is still more recent,
being due mainly to the rise of monetarism and itsemphasis on the exogeneity
and importance of monetary policy.
In the currently prevalent linear stochasticmodels, fiscal and monetary
operations can produce either destabilizing shocks orstabilizing
91n the presence ofa loqg-term upward trend in P, this model would focuson
the relation between Q/Q and the actual andexpected inflation rates p and e• When Q/Q' >1,inflation would accelerate, i.e. p and e increase; when QIQ<1, p and e tend to decline. Another modification of themodel is that
some authors dispense with the concept of a short-runupward sloping AS curve,
keep the vertical AS curve at full employment, and workdirectly with shifts
in the horizontal predetermined price levels.(Examples of these different
treatments can be found today in most of thepopular macroeconomic texts.)Lw
interventions,depending on how well they are timed, quantified, and
executed. Some actions are taken to correct previous actions newly discovered
to have been in error. So this approach permits a comprehensive treatmentof
policies and related variables, which can be revealing -ifnot pushed too
hard.
Consider a monetary acceleration intended to revive a sluggish economy
that has a cumulative lagged effect of fanning a business expansion into an
inflationary boom, whereupon restrictive measures are taken that shift AD back
and replace excess demand with excess supply. The concept of a cycle driven
by such policy errors was popularized by the persistent monetaristcriticism
of the Federal Reserve whose discretionary policies were time and again
described as doing "too much too late." But it is hard to see how this
argument can be generalized, and there is no sufficient evidence to support an
attempt to do so. It would be indeed strange for such failures not to give
rise to caution and learning but rather to be recurring with much the same
negative results. Government miscalculations may well be common but they do
not offer a good basis for explaining the long existence and wide diffusion of
business cycles.
3.Nonlinearities
In linear models, time lags that cause overshooting in adjustments to
equilibrium are essential to produce fluctuations in response to shocks.
Nonlinear models can explain endogenously the existence and amplitude of a
limit cycle without any shocks and explicit lags. (This is shown by a long
line of work, from Kaldor 194O and Goodwin 1951 on nonlinear investment-saving
processes and cyclical profit shares to Schinasi 1982 on the integrationof
such functions and an IS-LM model with a government budget constraint). But
limit-cycle models need shocks to diversify the cycles and lags to determine141
their periods. And after all, it stands to reason that a successful
explanation of how the "real world" economies move will have to include all
these elements --randomor exogenous disturbances and delayed reactions as
well as nonlinearities.
Technical and scientific advances are facilitating work with reasonably
comprehensive yet comprehensible models. Empirically much is known about the
role of leads and lags in business cycles. The part played by shocks is not
so well understood and more controversial despite (or perhaps because of) the
current predominance of linear models that rely heavily of outside impulses of
all sorts. The neglect of nonhinearities may well have led to an
overstatement of the importance of random factors and perhaps also policy
changes treated as exogenous.
Nonlinear models now cover a wide range of business cycle theories: much
of the work has Keynesian and some has Marxian flavor, but classical and
neoclassical ideas are also represented (see the essays in Goodwin, Kruger,
and Vercelli. 19814 and Seinmler 1985). Grandxnont 1985 shows that persistent
deterministic fluctuations will emerge in an overlapping generations model in
which markets clear and perfect foresight is obtained along the transition
path through a sequence of periodic competitive equilibria. The basic
condition is simply that the older agents have a greater preference for
leisure. With the specified lag structure, cycles of different periods will
typically coexist. The model has classical properties and generates some
observed comovements, but it also suggests the possibility of an effective
countercyohical monetary policy. 10
10Compare related results on other applications of the OLGapproach that yield
multiple rational-expectations solutions (Zarnowitz 1985, pp. 562-63, gives a
brief summary). Grandmont's system has the classical dichotomy:equilibrium
prices are proportional to the stock of money, while the real variables areIntroduction of nonlinearities is necessary for modeling and analyses of
a variety of theoretical ideas such as (1) time irreversibilities or ratchet
effects employed in some early models of consumption and cyclical growth
(Duesenberry 19!9; Smithies 1957; Minsky 1959) and (2) discontinuities or
jumps at certain parameter values that can differentiate the length of cycle
phases or impose irregular fluctuations on long-term growth (from Goodwin 1951
to Day 1982, for example).11 For these and other good reasons, this field of
study is a promising and active one; but the work done so far is lopsidedly
devoted to manipulations of highly aggregative and abstract models. What is
badly needed is the development of tested knowledge of where the non-
linearities in the economy are located, how important they are, and what
effects they have. This will require much careful examination of existing,
and perhaps also collection of new, empirical data.
.Asymmetries
An important point that did receive some attention recently is the
possibility of basically asymmetrical cyclical behavior manifested in
contractions being on the average shorter and steeper than expansions. The
view that such an asymmetry exists is far from new; as shown below, it found
support in long historical evidence and was endorsed by some prominent
economists several decades ago. But linear techniques are not capable of
determined in the goods market. Prices are positively, real interest rates
are inversely correlated with output.
In contrast, a nonlinear model of capital accumulation in Foley 1986
shows how monetary and fiscal policies can fail to reduce cyclical instability
and may even increase it. Here the accelerator amplifies but liquidity
effects eventually constrain the cycle.
The variety of slopes and shapes of the partly smooth, partly oscillating
growth trajectories produced by recently developed purely deterministic models
is remarkable (see Day 1982, Figure 1, p. 1407), but it must be noted that
these movements are much less persistent and more "chaotic" than those
observed in economic aggregates during business cycles.L3
representingor explaining this type of behavior.
Mitchell (1927, pp. 330314) noted that frequency distributions of month-
to-month changes in trend-adjusted indexes of business activity for periods
between 1875 and 1925 are slightly skewed to the left in each case. He wrote
that "abrupt declines usually occur in crises; the greatest gains...come
as reactions after sudden drops;" also, that "the number of declines is
smaller than the number of advances, but the average magnitude of the declines
is greater." He concluded that "Business contraction seems to be a briefer
andmoreviolent process that business expansion."
Keynes appears to have narrowed the asymmetry from the total phases of
rise and fall to the peak and trough zones. He wrote of "the phenomenon of
the crisis -thefact that the substitution of a downward for an upward
tendency often takes place suddenly and violently, whereas there is, as a
rule, no such sharp turning-point when an upward is substituted for a downward
tendency" (1936, p. 311fl.12
Table 5 shows average amplitude values, i.e., rates of change or slopes,
for cyclical upswings and downswings in several long historical series with
adjustments for secular trends. The measures are reproduced from Mitchell
1927 andBurnsand Mitchell 1946 (or based on the data given therein; see
notes in the table). For Mitchell's series in trend—adjusted form, the number
ofmonth-to-month increases tends to exceed that of declines but slightly
(column2), whilethe absolute size of increases tends to be smaller than that
ofdeclines by varying differentials (columns 3 and Zr). The deposits series
12Hicks held a similar view of theasymmetry but less strongly. He related it
to the "monetary deflation" that may accompany the real downturn and make it
more severe (1950, pp. 115-18, 106—62). Keynes explained the "crisis" mainly
by "a sudden collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital" (op. cit.,p.
315).Table 5
Average Rates of Rise and Fall in Indexes of Business Activity,
Unadjusted and Trend-Adjusted Monthly Data for United States,
1875— 1933
Percent Average Relative Amplitude per MonthC
Rise Fall
Trend-Adjusted Datad Unadjusted Data





















13 117 3.0 2.8
6 53 2.8 3.3
0.62 0.65 0.56 0.914
1.3
aNumber of complete specific cycles covered (trough-to-trough or peak-to-peak, whichever
larger). In (B-M) only corresponding cycles that show up in both unadjusted and trend-
adjusted data are included (see note e).
is
bNljmber of rises plus half the number of no change expressed as percent of all month—to-month
changes covered. (Calculated from data in Mitchell 1927, p. 333.)
cBased on relative deviations from trend ordinates CM) or specific—cycle relatives (B—M).
dTrends calculated by original sources as smooth functions of time (oscillatory for bond
yields, upward for the other series).
eCycles in 18614—68, 1899-1905, and 1909—114 are omitted as non—corresponding.
Sources: (M) Mitchell 1927, tabulation on p. 333 and text, pp. 326—314.
(B—M) Burns and Mitchell 19146, Table 97, p. 291, and text, pp. 280—914.
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providesthe only exception here. The measures of Burns and Mitchell show the
downswingsasbeing on the average steeper (more rapid) than the upswings in
every case. The differences are relatively large for both the unadjusted and
trend-adjusted series, except for railroad bond yields, where the trend is
oscillatory (indeed downward most of the time, see Burns and Mitchell, 19146,
chart 36, p. 275).13
Blatt finds the results reported by Burns and Mitchell for the detrended
series to be very significant economically and statistically, and infers that
"a pronounced lack of symmetry is the rule" (1980; 1983,p. 232). He views
this as a strong contradiction of the Frisch-type random shock theory of
business cycles, which implies symmetrical fluctuations around trend.
DeLong and Summers 1986 estimate coefficients of skewness in quarterly
growth rates of real GNP and industrial production from post—World War II data
for the six major OECD countries. The asymmetry hypothesis impliesnegative
skewness. The estimates have negative signs in 9 out of 12 cases but they are
generally small relative to the calculated standard errors. For the United
States, annual data show more evidence of negative skewness than quarterly
data, particularly for GNP in the postwar period. Surprisingly, the skewness
is positive (but not significant) for the U.S. quarterly real GNP series in
1891—1915 and 1923-140. The authors conclude (p. 176) that "It is reasonable
in a first approximation to model business cycles as symmetric oscillations
about a rising trend" since "GNP growth rates and industrial productiongrowth
rates do not provide significant evidence of asymmetry."
13For electricity output,1921-33, a strongly growing series, the rise and
fall amplitudes are 1.0 and 0.8 in the unadjusted data, 0.5 and 0.7 in trend-
adjusted data, respectively. This is an example of an asymmetry that is
concealed by the trend in the original series, but it is based on two
corresponding series only (cf. Blatt 1983, p. 231).246
Itwould seem that this inference is too strong and probably premature,
being based on uncertain assumptions and evidence.The standard errors of
skewness are estimated from Monte Carlo simulations that assumethe growth
rates to be stationary third-order autoregression processes.The reasoning of
Mitchell, Keynes, and Hicks attributes the asymmetry largelyto the occurrence
of sharp downturns in investment and/or monetary stringencies andfinancial
crises. This is a plausible hypothesis which would surely lead us to expect
more asymmetry in the earlier era than after World War II, butthe DeLong-
Summers results unaccountably show the opposite. The GNP data inevitably are
much less reliable for the former period. The Mitchell and Burns seriesused
in Table 24, though limited and partly overlapping in coverage, provide more
observations and may well be on firmer ground. The evidence based on themis
also less general and conclusive that it was interpreted to be, but it
certainly should not be ignored or dismissed.
Neftci 19824 rejects the null hypothesis of symmetry for unemploymentin
the United States 19248—81 on the strength of tests applied only to data on the
direction (not size) of changes in several series of jobless rates. DeLong
and Summers are critical of such tests for sacrificing power but their own
results confirm those of Neftçi even more strongly: quarterly U.S. data show
positive skewness in unemployment and negative skewness in employment,both
significant at the 5% level. However, they find no evidence of asymmetriesin
quarterly unemployment series for the five other OECD countries in 1950-79.
This last result, though, relies heavily on difficult trend adjustments for
large rises in European unemployment after 1973 assumed to be noncyclical;if
not so detrended, these series would appear strongly skewed. There is much
that is unexplained and uncertain about these findings.124
It is true that the appearance of strong asymmetries in unadjusted time147
series is due to a large extent to the prevailing seculargrowth, and so is
the fact that business expansions are much longer thancontractions, as noted
by DeLong and Summers. But even series that contain no upward trendsor from
which such trends have been eliminated as well as possible oftenshow visibly
asymmetric behavior of the envisaged type. If no asymmetriesoccurred, the
upswing and downswing phases of growth cycles should be about equal inlength
on the average over time. But Table 3 shows that high—growthphases were
typically longer than low-growth phases (cf. columns 3 and 5).
Table 6 lists the differences between theaverage durations, high—growth
minus low-growth phase: they are all positive (column1). For United States,
Canada, and United Kingdom, they are small (1 to 3 months), for WestGermany
near zero. For the other six countries, they are muchlarger (9 to 17 months)
and statistically significant at 2-15% levels; thestrongest evidence that
high—growth phases tend to be longer comes from the measures forJapan,
Australia, and the Netherlands (columns 2-14).
Other indications that nonhinearities areneglected or concealed by
currently popular methods of econometric and time-seriesanalysis are
scattered in recent literature (Blatt 1978; Britton1986, pp. 50—52; Neftçi
1986). The conclusions range all theway from saying that these methods are
very deficient (Blatt) to saying that they are the best available and
unscathed by a search for asymmetries (DeLong andSummers). Actually the
search has so far been short and weak. The evidence isnot very strong but on
114en detrended andplotted to appropriate scales, the unemployment rate and
(inverted) industrial production show closely similarfluctuations (see chart
in DeLong and Summers 1986,p. 175). The timing differences between the two
are partly systematic but small. Charts for other countriesdisplay much the
same cyclical patterns in the corresponding series (Kleinand Moore 1985,
chap. 14 and app. 14A and t4B.The test results may overstate the differences in
skewness between output and employment.48
Table6
Differences in Average Durations of High-Growth
and Low-Growth Phases, Ten Countries, 191481983
Country Difference, Degrees Standard
and Period HG minus LG, of Errr
t
Covered months Freedom (df)b(5)statiaticd
1. United States, 19148—82 1.3 17 14.914 0.26
2. Canada, 1950-82 2.0 18 3.714 0.514w
3. Japan, 1953—83 17.2 10 7.114 2.141
14. Australia, 1951—83 8.7 13 14.86 1.79k
5. United Kingdom, 1951—832.9 11 6.19 0.147
6. West Germany, 1951-83 0.2 11 6.63 0.03
7. France, 1957-79 13.2 8 8.76 1.51°
8. Italy, 1956—80 11.2 8 8.97 l.25
9. Netherlands, 1950—79 11.2 12 5.59 2.01k
10. Switzerland, 1950—75 16.8 8 11.96 1.140°
aHG average duration of high-growth phases; LGaverage duration of low-
growth phases.
bEquals N1 +N2
-2,where N1number of high growth phases and N2 =number
of low-growth phases.
(N _1)s2 +(N-1)s2N +N
a 1 1 2 2 1 2, where 2 and are variances of HG
N1+N2-2 N1N2
1 2
and LG phases, respectively.
dEntry in column 1 divided by entry in column 3.
*Significant at the 2% level; +atthe 5% level; °atthe 10% level;
Xatthe
15% level.
Source: Table 3.balance it suggests that business cycles do have potentiallyimportant
nonlinear characteristics. Further research on this front iscertainly
needed.
5. Do Expansions Die of Old Age?
Late in 1985 many observers greeted the third anniversary of the
continuing business expansion with a touch of worry. As measured byNBER,
only one of the six peacetime expansions since 1945 lasted more than39
months. Of the 14 comparable phases in 1854—1919, none survivedmore than
three years, and of the five in 1919145 only one did. Late in1986 the same
reasoning would lead to stronger fears of a downturn yet. But by mid-1987 the
expansion was nearing the peacetime record set only recently in 1975-79(58
months) and few forecasters expected a recession before 1988or 1989. Far
from being self-evident, the expectation that asan expansion grows older the
probability of its terminating increases is something that is yet to receive
full examination.
If business fluctuations were just random walks, then theirpast would
have no predictive value, and in particular theprobability of a peak (trough)
in any month of an ongoing expansion (contraction) wouldbe a constant
independent of the age of the phase. Indeed, McCulloch (1975)presents tests
showing that the probability of termination is equal for "young" and "old"
expansions, once the movement has exceeded some minimum duration, and that the
same applies to contractions. This suggests to him that business fluctuations
are merely like the "Monte Carlo cycles" the superstitiousgamblers
misperceive in their luck at casinos or racetracks, i.e.,pseudo—cycles with
"no periodicity, rhythm, or patternexcept perhaps a trend" (p. 303).
On the other hand, Meftci (1982) offers a formula foran "optimal"
prediction of cyclical downturns, one component of which is theprobability of50
a peak this month based just on the length ofthe expansion to date. (The
other is the probability of observing this month's value of the percentage
change in the index of leading indicators when thetrend in that index is
upward.) Neftçi estimates the probabilities by smoothing thedistributions of
the observed phase durations and percent changes in the leading index.Thus
he expects the duration of an expansion in itself to be of some help in
predicting the peak (mutatis mutandis, the same applies to contractionsand
troughs). A degree of success is claimed for this approach and some
modifications improve it further (Palash and Radecki 1985; deLeeuw, Missouri,
and Robinson 1986).
McCulloch's tests present some technical problems: it seems that small
changes in the underlying assumptions and data can lead to very different
conclusions (de Leeuw 1987). But even if his results were entirely
acceptable, his interpretation of them is not. Business cycles need not be
strictly periodic to differ radically from purely random movements. The many
important regularities well documented in studies of domestic, foreign,and
international business fluctuations simply cannot be reconciled with the
notion of "Monte Carlo cycles." Business cycles are far too persistent and
pervasive for that, and they contain far too many common features with common
explanations. In both relatively short and long, small and large expansions
and contractions, some variables conform strongly, others weakly, some
positively, others inversely. There are systematic differences in cyclical
amplitudes as well, and numerous recurring timing sequences as some variables
tend to lead, others lag, at business cycle peaks and/or troughs.
Meftçi's and related exercises suggest that the potential contribution of
the phase duration measures and associated probabilities to the problem of
forecasting business cycle turning points is likely to be modest, though51
probably not zero as hypothesized by MeCulloch. It would indeed besurprising
to find otherwise. The probability of a peak duringan expansion, or of a
trough during a contraction, is clearly not just or even largely a function of'
the duration of the phase. Various combinations of internalstresses and
imbalances with external disturbances, including majorpolicy errors, can cut
the life of an economic recovery short or bring onan unsustainable boom.
Conversely, well-chosen policies and other favorable developmentscan prolong
an expansion by helping to keep a slowdown in theeconomy from sliding into an
absolute decline or a speedup from creatinginflationary demand pressures. A
recession may in itself create the conditions for the nextupturn, or the
recovery may be accelerated by stimulative policies.
Whatmattersprimarily, then, is not the passage of calendar time but
that which happens over time in and to theeconomy in motion. It is the
historical and psychological time filled with events andprocesses,
perceptions and actions. This is, of course, generally so in humanaffairs.
There is a simple corollary: knowledge of thecurrent phase of the business
cycle and its age can help but must not be used in isolation. Itsproper role
is to assist in the interpretation of thecontemporaneous movements of the
economy by enabling us to compare systematically the present with the
historical patterns of the indicators.
6.Predictabilityand Costs
Business cycle turning points, particularlypeaks, tend to be associated
with unusually large forecasting errors (Zarnowitz1979, 1986). If the
durations of expansions and contractions had beenhighly stable over extended
periods, forecasters (and indeed economically active and observantpeople in
general) should have long learned how to predict thetiming of these phases
with considerable accuracy. The fact thateconomic downturns and to a lesser52
extent upturns cause much surprise is therefore a strong primafacie argument
against the hypothesis that business cycles are periodic.Since major
slowdowns and recessions produce individual losses and social distress,there
are surely major incentives to improve the relatedforecasts and decisions.
Moreover, in the presence of continuing and recognizable periodicities, ways
would presumably be found to reduce cyclical instability or so to adjustto it
that it did relatively little harm to the economy at large.
Indeed, no grave and persistent economic and social problems arecaused
by seasonal fluctuations despite their broad diffusionand large quantitative
importance. This is so because the seasonal cycles are generallyclose to
being periodic and predictable. Businessmen, workers, and consumers possess
much accumulated knowledge of how to cope with this type of anticipated
instability, and there exist various institutional and market arrangementsto
help. True, seasonal variations have stochastic components that canbe a
source of significant forecasting and decision errors, but these are properly
matters of private concern. In contrast, recurrent slumps that generate
declines in sales, production, and incomes along with rises in unemployment
clearly belong to the sphere of public interest, and so do recurrent
inflationary or speculative booms.
It is certainly possible to conceive of causes of highly periodic,
persistent, and costly cycles in total output and employment. Theywould have
to be exogenous, inevitable, and themselves periodic. The classic case here
is the weather cycle, whether due to variations in sunspot intensity or other
factors (Jevons 188L1; Henry Moore 191Z). But today such explanations lack all
plausibility. Moreover, the effects of such hypothetical externally imposed
cycles would resemble seasonal fluctuations much more than businesscycles.15
In short, the consideration of predictability and costs argue against the53
idea that business cycles are strongly and stably periodic. Theexistence of
limited and variable periodicities, however, cannot be excluded.
IV.Summaryand Conclusions
The historical chronologies of business cycles provide evidencethat is
on the whole inconsistent with the hypothesis of strong overallperiodicity,
according to which these fluctuations tend tobe of constant length.True,
over long stretches of time similar average durations are obtained for the
principal economies (about four years in the United States, fiveyears in
Great Britain), and most cycles fall within theranges of year around these
means. But the dispersion measures for all cycle durations are large in
absolute and relative terms everywhere. There is asharp contrast in this
respect between business cycles and the almost strictly periodic seasonal
fluctuations.
Nevertheless, examples of approximate periodicity limited in time exist
and deserve attention. Thus for Britain 1958-82turning point comparisons,
autocorrelations, spectral analysis, and autoregressions all support the
statement that "The appearance of the trade cycle...isunusually, although
not uniquely, periodic" (Britton 1986,p. 52). But a major (and fully
recognized) difficulty with these results is that twenty-fiveyears of data is
a slender basis for determining cycles whose typical lengthmaybefive
years. Yet over longer periods the structure of the economy is likely to
change in ways that would alter the periodicity.17
171n fact, Britton's results forearlier periods in the modern history of the
United Kingdom and for the United States since 1960 differ anddepend greatly
on methods of estimation. Unlike for Britain, the evidence for the United
States (based on unemployment data) is found to be"relatively weak and514
Spectral analysis indicates a relative concentration of power around
frequencies corresponding to the average duration of business cycles (near 14
years). Since these techniques are applied to trendless or detrended series,
the average growth-cycle duration (about 3 years) may be more relevant here,
and spectral peaks that approximate it are found as well. These estimates,
however, are of uncertain significance, and the approach also suggests other
periodicities, including some that are clearly outside the range of observed
nonseasonal fluctuations.
These observations suggest that business cycles defy simple
characterizations, showing a strong tendency to recur and at times even near
periodicity, along with great diversity and evolution of phase durations. It
is difficult but necessary to recognize such phenomena in the theoretical work
on the subject.
Periodic business cycles are represented in the theoretical literature by
a variety of models. The nonlinear accelerator-multiplier interactions can
produce a limit cycle. Where elections are periodic, a "political business
cycle" could conceivably have a parallel rhythm. These models have some
rather evident and serious problems, and it does not redound to their
advantage that they can generate periodicity which is more exact and general
than consistent with likelihood and observation. But this does not mean that
linearities may safely be neglected; on the contrary, they are probably
important and their empirical identification is much needed. In particular,
there are some indications of asymmetrical cyclical behavior. One set of
these is provided by historical trend-adjusted series whose downswings tend to
be steeper than upswings. Another consists of estimated durations of growth
cycle phases in the post-World War II period: for most countries surveyed,
doubtful" (op. cit., p. LJ4; for detail see chaps. 1 and 14).55
the periods of above-average growth tend to be longer than the periods of
below-average growth.
The variability in length of business expansions and contractions is
sufficiently large for the timing of cyclical turning points (particularly
peaks) to be, demonstrably, very difficult to forecast. The age of a phase
alone Is not of much help in predicting the date of its end: what matters
more is the dynamics of the evolving business situation. The regularity of
business cycles manifests itself primarily in aspects of suchdynamics -
persistentcomovements of specific indicators, the leads and lags involved,
etc. There is no evidence that close and lasting periodicities exist in the
recurrence of socially costly recessions here or abroad, and there are good
general reasons why they are not visible. Important hidden periodicitlesmay
well exist, although even they are not likely to be unique,well-defined, and
stable.56
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